The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation

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Ones U., Putterman L.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, cilt.62, sa.4, ss.495-521, 2007 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 62 Sayı: 4
  • Basım Tarihi: 2007
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.018
  • Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.495-521
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, heterogeneous preferences, group formation, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, RECIPROCITY, COOPERATION, PUNISHMENT, PREFERENCES, ECONOMICS, GAME, FAIRNESS, DILEMMA
  • Ankara Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Accumulating evidence suggests that the outcomes of laboratory public goods games reflect individually differing preferences and beliefs. We designed a public goods experiment with targeted punishment opportunities to (a) confirm subject heterogeneity, (b) test the stability of subjects' types, and (c) test the proposition that differences in group outcomes can be predicted by knowing the types of individuals who compose those groups. We find that differences in the inclination to cooperate have persistence and that significantly greater social efficiency can be achieved by grouping less cooperative subjects with those inclined to punish free riding while excluding those prone to perverse retaliation against cooperators. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.