Research Information System
Dynamic Games and Applications, vol.12, no.4, pp.1163-1188, 2022 (SCI-Expanded, Scopus)
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.We model the interaction between science and technology using an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Conflictual rather than synergistic relation between science and technology is assumed, in which they rely on openness and secrecy as alternative behavioral norms. We argue that science-driven technology and intellectual property extension to basic science blur the distinction between openness and secrecy, which result in competition and tension between them. We first discuss why two-player static games are insufficient to model the interaction between science and technology. Then, we show that there are different dynamical outcomes in multiplayer settings, including coexistence in which both of these strategies survive. Finally, we discuss how the stable equilibria of the evolutionary game are related to the codification of knowledge, and intellectual property rights policies that affect the balance between open culture and exclusive control rights.