Kaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, cilt.22, sa.2, ss.546-561, 2023 (Hakemli Dergi)
The aim of this paper is to deal with the possibility and its conditions of forgiveness in the theory of Derrida and Aristotle. Aristotle contends that forgiveness is/should be under specific circumtances; otherwise, it is owing to some defects emanating from the forgiver, contrary to Derrida’s assertion that a pure forgiveness is unconditional. The study will try to question which of the given designs in relation to forgiveness is more competent in terms of fairness and feasibility by considering whether it is progressive. It will be claimed as a result that Derrida's notion of unconditional forgiveness does not defend the forgiver's rights, causes alienation from justice, and has a detrimental effect rather than being progressive. Contrarily, it will be argued that Aristotle's idea of conditional forgiveness treats the forgiver and the forgiven fairly, operates on the premise of justice, and should be applied to social practices because of its progressive effect.