Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi, cilt.65, sa.2, ss.673-698, 2024 (Scopus)
Naṣṣ is not just a methodological term; it is also an ideological concept. Therefore, conveying the technical uses of the word “naṣṣ” alone is insufficient to reveal its true nature. This paper deals with naṣṣ in three parts. The first part entails an analysis of multiple “naṣṣ definitions” based on Islamic legal theory [uṣūl al-fiqh]. Originally, “naṣṣ” referred to “clear words and expressions” within a text. However, over time, it came to denote “statements that have precise meanings with a high degree of certainty” that do not allow for other interpretations. This shift in meaning gave the word a normative character beyond its linguistic denotation. It was probably after the 5th century of the Islamic calendar that it started to refer to “the verses and hadiths.” The unification of these two different types of evidence under a single category is a very important development with critical methodological implications. The second part focuses on the process that established “the idea of naṣ” as an ideology based on uṣūl al-fiqh. To characterize the “idea of naṣ,” this part first emphasizes that, while often used interchangeably, text and naṣṣ are separate things. A text is considered a naṣṣ only when it is seen as a compilation of theological arguments in the form of a book. This is a critical paradigm shift from the concept of “divine addresses that gradually descended into their original contexts” to that of “a book that contains theological arguments to be cited selectively for the purpose of reading in certain historical settings.” Hence, the most essential characteristic of ‘the idea of naṣ’ is that it distances the text from its original character of verbal speech (al-khiṭāb). The term al-khiṭāb is often used to describe the Qur’an in current religious writing, but this use is fairly new. During the first three centuries, scholars primarily used the word in its lexical sense, disregarding its potential to describe the relationship between revelation and society. After the fourth century, however, the term began to be employed in a technical sense, namely in relation to legal obligations. Accordingly, the term “addressee” (al-mukhāṭāb) was also intended to refer to the individual who is legally accountable under the law. The conclusion part of the article has been comprised of a presentation of the results derived from the preceding two parts in the form of definitive findings.